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Abstract  
 
The Kurdish movement‟s decision to operate within and in opposition to the Turkish 
state reached a peak between 2013 and 2015. Three major events took place during this 
time period: the launch of the 2013 peace process, the 2014 presidential elections, and 
the June 2015 general elections. The principal driving force behind these campaigns 
was an important project put forward by Kurdish activists, which they termed as 
Türkiyelileşme [Turkeyfication]: an inclusive definition of national identity, which 
accepted being an integral part of Turkey while at the same time belonging to an ethnic 
group other than Turkish. 
Basing the argument on the Kurdish activists‟ capacity to combine civil society 
activism and their promotion of democracy with the articulation of a national identity, 
this article considers the dynamics of the Kurdish movement along the lines of a “total 
social movement” between 2013 and 2015. Put forward by the sociologist Alain 
Touraine, a total social movement is a three-dimensional movement with social, 
political and national levels of action. It embodies fierce opposition between 
adversaries, but does not opt for violence no matter what the challenges are.   
 
 
Keywords: Touraine; Total Social Movements; the Solidarity Movement; Ethnicity; Kurds, 
Turkey  
 
Introduction    
 
The Kurdish movement – from 2013 through to 2015 – developed into a total social 
movement that wished to stay within a reformed Turkish polity. According to Alain 
Touraine, a “total social movement” can be qualified as a three-dimensional pro-democracy 
and civil society movement with a national character. Social actors who participate in a total 
social movement demonstrate a strong will to change their society through peaceful actions, 
refusing violence as well as the monopoly of an ideology, organisation, group or state, no 
matter what the challenges and difficulties are.
1
  
My intention is to demonstrate the renewed relevance of Touraine‟s total social 
movement theory through the study of the Kurdish movement in Turkey. The Kurdish 
movement reached its culminating “total” point with the 2015 Turkish general elections 
during which it had become the spokesperson for the majority of the progressive forces in 
Turkey. From October 2015 onwards, however, a difficulty imposed itself on this total social 
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movement: first came the bombings of Ankara on 10 October, in which numerous members 
of the pro-Kurdish Peoples‟ Democratic Party (HDP) and other democrats lost their lives; 
then the snap elections of 1 November 2015, in which the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) regained its constitutional majority, causing the HDP to lose 21 deputies compared to 
the previous elections, therefore considerably reducing their parliamentary representation. 
Furthermore, there was a resumption of armed clashes between the Kurdistan Workers‟ Party 
(PKK) and Turkish government forces while civilians in the Kurdish regions suffered under 
curfews and violence. The question then is whether the events that have occurred since 
October 2015 have called into question the total social movement quality of the Kurdish 
movement in Turkey. These considerations do not invalidate the argument in view of the 
originality of the main idea with regard to Touraine. In fact, a total social movement can only 
live under a peaceful climate. Therefore, the absence of violence is an essential criterion for 
the emergence and consolidation of total social movements. 
Firstly, this article introduces the theory of the total social movement through the 
original example of the Polish Solidarity movement, upon which Touraine had initially 
developed his theory in 1980. Secondly, it explores the civil-society activist, democracy-
advocating and national aspects of the Kurdish movement between 2013 and 2015, according 
to which it can qualify as a total social movement in this time frame. Finally, the limits of the 
Kurdish case as a total social movement are discussed.
2
  
 
The Original Example of the Total Social Movement Theory: The Polish Solidarity 
Movement 
 
In 1980, Touraine and his colleagues carried out an in-depth research, a sociological 
intervention, on the causes and dynamics of the Solidarity movement in Poland. This method 
brings together social actors and provides a collective platform where they can confront each 
other and debate their cause, providing the sociologist an opportunity to analyse the meaning 
that social actors attribute to their actions from close up. The study on the Solidarity 
movement included direct involvement of its rank-and-file militants as well as organisers, 
known as the National Committee. The researchers observed that Solidarity militants and 
leaders were committed to obtaining workers‟ rights, putting forward aspects of their national 
identity and yearning for democracy. The combination of their aspirations led Touraine and 
his colleagues to determine the contours of a total social movement in the Polish context of 
1980 (Touraine 1983: 2).
3
   
Solidarity came into being during the strikes of Polish workers in August 1980 but 
rapidly garnered national and democratic significance (Touraine 1983: 37). The most crucial 
aspect of the movement was that it was three-dimensional, “…it encompassed and 
incorporated national and democratic aspirations as well as those of class, and that these 
[were] fused and inseparable” (Martel and Stammers 1996: 129). Touraine argued that 
Solidarity was clearly a trade-union activity initiated by self-confident workers who went on 
strike, protested against low-wages, expressed solidarity with fellow workers, and fought 
back against state repression. But it was also a national fulfilment movement as the militants 
of Solidarity pressed their national authority to detach Poland from the influence of the Soviet 
Union. Inspired by representative democracies elsewhere, Solidarity was also a struggle for 
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the goal of reaching democratisation in Poland. On these grounds, Touraine and his 
colleagues wanted “to discover why and how these three levels of action – trade union, 
democratic and national – combine in Solidarity to form what may be called a total social 
movement aiming to change all aspects of public life” (Touraine 1983: 2). 
 
The Emergence of a Total Social Movement  
 
When analysing Solidarity, it is important to bear in mind that it was born in a country of the 
Communist Bloc, governed by a one party-state, or, in Touraine‟s formulation, a “Party-as-
Police”. Although Poland had become independent in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, the country remained under the shadow of the Soviet regime (Touraine 1983: 44). Thus, 
by the 1980s, the Polish national liberation struggle was different from the more traditional 
national liberation agendas across America and Asia. Solidarity aimed to fight the status quo 
imposed by an outside totalitarian system rather than by a domestic state authority (Touraine 
1983: 4). The articulations of a Polish national identity played an important role in this 
struggle, and subsequently in the evolution of Solidarity toward a total social movement. 
Drawing on Touraine‟s empirical evidence, the Polish people believed that their 
collective identity can be found in their language, history and the Catholic faith. From this 
perspective, it could be argued that the Polish people have historically relied upon objective 
varieties of nationalism such as language, common history and religious affiliation to 
strengthen their collective identity. Evidence of this can be found in the publications of 
Solidarity, whose militants collaborated with numerous dissident writers and critics of Polish 
origin to revise school material and restore Polish history. In terms of religious affiliation, the 
Catholic Church occupied a predominant place in the national perception of the Polish 
people. For example, the majority of Solidarity workers, who were Catholic, had a history of 
oppression under the Protestant Prussians in the past. With Solidarity, they were able to 
express their allegiance to God, and not to the Party, especially before they started work 
every day. Thus the Polish militants clung onto their national unity through the strengthening 
of the Polish language and the Catholic faith as a way of breaking away from their de facto 
dependency on the Soviets. 
Nevertheless, Solidarity cannot solely be reduced to its national dimension. Touraine 
and his colleagues defined its broad objectives in terms of the overall dynamics of the 
Solidarity movement rather than national cohesion only. Through the voices of the men and 
women they observed in the factories and interviewed, the authors conveyed the idea that 
dominant social and economic forces do not – and, as engaged post-Marxist sociologists, 
should not – determine the future. Social actors, however subordinate they may appear, 
possess the capacity to produce a history of their own through various forms of struggle. 
They have the will to bring about change and create momentum. 
Although Solidarity emerged and consolidated itself in the factories, it surpassed the 
activation of working-class consciousness among workers. The issues at stake between the 
participants of Solidarity and the party regime went beyond the regulation of wages and 
conditions of employment. The workers wanted to cast aside the Party rule and establish an 
independent trade-union which could operate freely and defend not only workers‟ but 
everybody else‟s rights in the country (Touraine 1983: 97), which can be seen as one of the 
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highest criteria of democracy. Therefore, another noteworthy aspect of Solidarity was that it 
“appeal[ed] openly to the values of democracy, human rights and political pluralism” 
(Touraine 1983: Introduction).  
In Touraine's thinking, a total social movement does not resort to violence. Neither 
should it engage in a purely nationalist, socialist, revolutionary or any ideological rhetoric to 
survive. Ideologies care less about social justice and democracy, leaving their adherents to 
realise what they consider to be their historic destiny (Touraine 1992). A total social 
movement remains an organised and preferably non-violent campaign, and relies on its own 
original dynamics no matter what the circumstances are or might become.
4
  
It can be argued that every socio-political movement contains plural dynamics like 
Solidarity, without necessarily qualifying as a total social movement. Since Solidarity drew 
most of its strength from self-emancipated workers, it could have become a proletarian 
movement, confining its demands to the workplace. Moreover, the militants of Solidarity 
were not short of national attachments: like other nations, they took pride in their common 
history and language to reject foreign domination. Therefore, it could also have rapidly 
mutated into a strictly nationalistic struggle against the Soviet Union, inciting people to 
violence in the name of a Polish nation, for example. In such a scenario, Solidarity would not 
have found it difficult to mobilise the Catholic Church‟s support in order to co-opt large 
segments of a religiously-devoted population in this hypothetical fight. Last but not least, as 
the type of democracy that was promoted had not been implemented and its ramifications 
were as yet unknown, Solidarity could have also shifted its orientation from democracy to 
some other ideal. However, what secured Solidarity its legitimacy as a total social movement 
was the way in which its militants managed to remain committed to not allowing a specific 
group or ideology to monopolise or modify their initial objective – which was to change the 
orientation of the society in which they lived through social, peaceful, and democracy-
rewarding activities.  
 
Applying Touraine’s Total Social Movement Theory to the Kurdish Case  
 
Despite potential challenges and limitations, I aim to bring Touraine‟s total social movement 
theory into discussion with the Kurdish movement, testing it as an example placed outside of 
the Western context in which this theory had initially been incubated. The Kurdish movement 
in Turkey having traditionally been a movement for the liberation of the Kurds, it attained 
neither independence nor autonomy as opposed to similar national movements in modern 
history. The closest it has come to achieving its objectives in this regard is the Turkish state‟s 
official recognition of a “Kurdish reality” from the early 2000s onward.  
The Kurdish movement, as are many other movements with identity claims, is usually 
seen as a regional movement, or at least geographically delimited. This view is also 
commonly shared by those who see the Kurdish movement as a strictly nationalist movement. 
My definition of the Kurdish movement is that while it carries geographical and national 
aspects, it also has the capacity to turn into a total social movement with audiences 
supporting its cause not only in the Kurdish regions but also in other parts of Turkey.
5
 This 
article further considers the Kurdish movement in Turkey comprising a whole with different 
actors, both politically engaged and armed, including the PKK, several Kurdish political 
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parties and non-governmental organisations operating in the region as well as many ordinary 
citizens and activists.
6
  
From 2013 through to 2015, the claims for a Kurdish identity increasingly suggested a 
willingness to work within the existing political system in Turkey, albeit calling for 
significant change to it, including the re-evaluation and redrafting of the Turkish constitution 
(drafted after the military coup of 1980) as well as the decentralisation of executive and 
legislative power across Turkey. During this timescale, the Kurdish movement has become 
simultaneously democracy-advocating and civil-society activist while remaining national.  
There were three major turning points for the transformation of the movement. First, a 
long-winded Kurdish struggle resulted in peace talks attended by the Turkish government, the 
PKK and its jailed leader Abdullah Öcalan, with a direct impact on the Kurdish grassroots in 
Turkey. By no means did these talks mean that opposition between the Kurds and the Turkish 
state ended. In fact, the Kurdish movement insisted on changing the overall orientation of 
Turkish and Kurdish societies while the government gradually drifted toward 
authoritarianism. The second development in this timescale was Turkey‟s 2014 presidential 
elections. For the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, a Kurdish candidate 
presented himself for the President‟s office on behalf of a political party with a long history 
of oppression, closure and opposition because of its explicit Kurdish political agenda. The 
third development was the environment in which the June 2015 legislative elections took 
place. This was when the Kurdish movement appeared to have reached its peak as a total 
social movement. For the first time in decades, the Kurdish party presented itself as a 
political party rather than nominating independent candidates, despite the high Turkish 
electoral threshold of 10 percent of the national vote to be allowed representation in 
Parliament, a threshold which still applies today.  
What exactly made the Kurdish movement “total” in Touraine‟s sense was its project of 
Türkiyelileşme [Turkeyfication], which enjoyed the support of large segments of the 
population, including Turks and Kurds. Türkiyelileşme put forward an inclusive aspect to the 
national identity of the Kurdish movement. Its democracy-advocating performances 
broadened to the inclusion of women, minorities (i.e. ethnic, religious and sexual) and other 
disadvantaged groups in political representation, while new horizons were reached, and 
concerns widened to all aspects of public life, including the economy, infrastructure and the 
environment. Not a single day went by without a specific campaign:
7
 a street protest 
denouncing the incarceration of political activists and the rolling down of shutters by 
shopkeepers; a collective gathering against the construction of new military headquarters in 
the Kurdish regions; a press conference held by representatives of human rights associations; 
a collective prayer session in Kurdish language to contribute to the public use of their mother 
tongue;
8
 or a silent sit-in in memory of those disappeared at the hands of previous Turkish 
governments.
9
 As such, the Kurdish movement united social, political and national claims 
and the necessity to release a “social space”10 for themselves, in which they could fight for 
their rights through legal means, which were traditionally undermined by the drawbacks of a 
homogeneous, unitarian and oppressive political system. 
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The Peace Process That Was  
 
In 2013, the Turkish state‟s treatment of the Kurdish agenda was brought into sharp focus by 
the peace negotiations among the PKK, Öcalan and Turkish government officials.11 The 
trajectory of Turkey‟s Kurdish movement envisaged the normalisation of relations, however 
precariously, with the Turkish state (Cal  lar 2014; Chase 2013). The peace process provided 
a possibility to address the Kurdish issue through non-violence as a matter of human rights 
and a critique of state oppression. The withdrawal of the majority of Kurdish armed groups 
from Turkey further produced a tangible effect on the trajectory of the Kurdish movement 
that was now coming to the fore with its peace-rewarding activities.
12
 A record number of 
778 civil society organisations from across the region issued a common declaration in support 
of the peace process (Karabağl  2013). The president of the Human Rights Association‟s 
Diyarbak r branch shared the following with the public: 
 
The peace process… created a conducive environment for peace and the resolution of our 
problems. Öcalan‟s call to withdraw the PKK‟s military out of Turkey is the most 
important step in this regard. As the regional civil society organisations, we 
wholeheartedly support this process (Diyarbakir Bulletin 2013: 50).
13 
 
A “delegation of eminent people” was created on 4 April 2013 to further disseminate aspects 
of the peace process to the public (Gürsel 2013). The main opposition to this came from the 
Turkish ultra-nationalist National Action Party (MHP), and to a lesser degree, the 
Kemalist/secular nationalist Republican People‟s Party (CHP), who opposed the peace 
process with the PKK on the grounds that it aimed to eliminate the territorial integrity of 
Turkey – the heritage of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.14 The delegation included political actors, 
artists, singers, writers, intellectuals, and labour unionists; in short, those respected by both 
the Turkish and Kurdish public for what they have achieved professionally. Visiting citizens 
in their homes and workplaces, even in the most forgotten corners of the country, the 
delegates did not represent a political party or a specific ideology. They discussed the peace 
initiative with the public, emphasising the serious socio-economic problems created by the 
Kurdish-Turkish conflict and the importance of stability and peace. 
 
Neighbourhood Councils  
 
This atmosphere led to the further strengthening of civil society organisations in the Kurdish 
regions. Both ordinary and activist Kurds operated mainly within the “neighbourhood, 
provincial and regional councils and assemblies”, where they would periodically draw up 
their voluntary action plans (Hürbakis 2014). Based on this practice, Akkaya and Jongerden 
made a case for a Kurdish version of democratic confederalism and radical democracy  which 
“refers to a societal organisation that can be characterised as a bottom-up system for self-
administration, organised at the levels of village (köy), urban neighbourhood (mahalle), 
district (ilçe), city (kent), and region (bölge)” (Jongerden 2015). A Kurdish version of radical 
democracy
15
 was tied with the principle of democratic confederalism, as Akkaya and 
Jongerden argue, and it “referred to self-governance of communities, where the aim was not 
to create a state, but to build a democratic society” (Jongerden 2015). Kurdish activists 
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believed that democratic confederalism provided autonomy for local communities and 
endowed them with resources and the ability to challenge the political, cultural and economic 
institutions in place. In this regard, Turkish journalist P nar Öğünç provided concrete 
evidence about how a direct democracy worked in the Kurdish context (Öğünç 2014). Based 
on her findings, the neighbourhood councils in the Kurdish regions were conceived as the 
smallest unit of the democratic autonomy model with no paid employees but many 
volunteers.
16
 They were run by co-chairs, a man and a woman, elected by the residents of 
neighbourhoods. The latter were directly involved in the process of decision-making on 
issues ranging from routine problems to reconciling family disputes to where new garbage 
containers were to be placed. 
 
Religion and Politics: A Balancing Act?  
 
Particularly from 2011 onward, Kurdish political party representatives and grassroots 
activists started to appear in large-scale religious demonstrations such as the “holy birth 
week”.17 They attended these rallies in the first ranks and carried posters of Kurdish religious 
figures and rebels in history. This was a time when the Kurdish movement enhanced its 
political claim-making profile through what many analysts have termed “the religious 
opening of the Kurdish movement” (Ekinci 2014). In solidarity with the campaigns of civil 
disobedience in the region, the Association of Religious Scholars and Solidarity (DİAY-
DER), a faith-based organisation whose members define themselves as “patriotic imams” 
spearheaded Civil Fridays; a series of powerful public collective prayers performed in 
Kurdish, rather than in Turkish or Arabic as is the custom. The prayers took place every 
Friday at a public square throughout the entire region. They brought together the faithful and 
activists, religious as well as political Kurdish leaders. Remarkably, at the end of every public 
prayer session, demands for democracy and constitutional recognition would gain ground 
over religiously-oriented demands.
18
 Lasting for more than thirty months, Civil Fridays 
marked an important change in the Kurdish movement‟s political agenda in the post-2011 
period, constituting a perfect example of the civil society activism within the Kurdish 
movement. The role of politically motivated religious mobilisation in the Kurdish case brings 
to mind the Solidarity movement in Poland and its close relations with the Catholic Church, 
which was considered as the main vehicle for resistance against communist rule.
19
   
On another level of analysis, the Kurdish movement‟s take on religion could also be 
understood within the framework of its desire to radically change the orientation of society – 
the core idea in Touraine‟s total social movement theory – by challenging Turkish state 
authorities on every possible level with the goal of keeping the ruling AKP from appealing to 
the Kurds. It is not a surprise that the AKP, with its promotion of Islam, has been able to 
address Kurdish audiences and earn their collaboration in many Kurdish cities in the East and 
Southeast regions of the country. By combining their political agenda with that of the faith-
based organisations, Kurdish activists gradually and pragmatically abandoned a purely 
secularist/non-religious discourse within a conservative community of “faithful Kurds” while 
politically defending the concept of fraternity from a religious viewpoint.
20
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 Unfolding Issues Other than Ethnic Identity 
 
A total social movement can be qualified as unfolding issues other than ethnic identity. 
Within the same context, the Kurds tried to develop a broader perspective to integrate the 
rights of other disadvantaged categories of Turkey‟s population into a constitutional or legal 
framework from a more functional and participatory democracy aspect. For instance, women 
were provided with more opportunities to present themselves as candidates in the elections on 
equal terms with their male counterparts. An active presence of women in politics, in what is 
believed to be a patriarchal society,
21
 aims to transform not only the traditional aspects of the 
society in which they live, but also to challenge the prevailing political system in Turkey – 
confirming Touraine‟s idea of societal transformation – where women, as in many other parts 
of the world, are still subject to diverse forms of discrimination.
22
  
This logic can also be applied to the case of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender) activists, Turks and Kurds alike, and other equity-seeking groups in Turkey that 
were given a voice within the Kurdish movement.
23
 In this regard, Kurdish activists and 
representatives brought up the issue of LGBT community rights during both street 
demonstrations and several parliamentary sessions. The same logic can furthermore be 
applied to members of other minorities such as the Assyrians, Chaldeans, Armenians, Yezidis 
and Alevis who were also given a voice within the legal Kurdish party to present themselves 
as candidates in Turkey‟s national elections (Güsten 2014; Inadina Haber 2015; Nahapetyan 
2015). This demonstrated the Kurdish movement‟s effort to appeal to a wider audience but, 
more importantly, to provide opportunities to those minorities whose identities were not 
represented politically or institutionally. The Kurdish movement, by integrating other 
minorities in its body politic, proposed a new concept of identity encompassing Turkey‟s 
diverse communities.
24
  
 
The 2015 Elections  
 
McAdam and Tarrow emphasise the importance of elections in social movements, a 
dimension which has been overlooked by social movement scholars in general. Their 
argument is that elections are an important part of the political process in which social 
movements, and, in this case, total social movements, evolve. Electoral outcomes help 
determine the dynamics of social movements (McAdam and Tarrow 2013: 326) because as 
Hutter and Kriesi additionally and rightly argue, “social movements are integrally related to 
mainstream politics” (Hutter and Kriesi 2013: 292). Historically, a Kurdish exclusion from 
elections at a group level has proven to be no remedy for Turkey‟s flawed democracy and the 
peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question. 
The June 2015 elections were, therefore, of utmost importance in enabling the Kurdish 
movement to anchor itself permanently within the Turkish political system, both in local 
governance and the Parliament. It was also an important opportunity for Kurdish activists to 
test the viability and credibility of their goal of Türkiyelileşme. When the HDP decided to 
present itself as a Party, rather than as independent candidates, unlike in 2007 and 2011,
25
 it 
received positive feedback from Turkish civil society, including intellectuals and political 
activists (T24, Radikal, Evrensel 2015).
26
 From the perspective of the project of 
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Türkiyelileşme, the essence of their message was clear: the HDP must be backed regardless of 
one‟s political affiliation because this would open the way for minority representation in the 
Parliament, which is a necessary development in advanced democracies. 
The June 2015 elections finally proved to be a historic landmark for the Kurdish 
movement: the HDP passed the 10 per cent threshold (a requirement for parliamentary 
representation), scored over 13 per cent of the total vote, and earned 81 parliamentary seats, 
becoming the third biggest political party in the Parliament. It doubled its overall vote on the 
national level,
27
 and the number of people who voted for the Kurdish party increased from 3 
million – its record before 2015 – to over 6 million.28  Such a return to the parliamentary 
arena was fundamental to the growth of the Kurdish total social movement.  
 
The National Aspects of a Total Social Movement 
 
The national, as one of Touraine's main pillars for a total social movement, is seen in the 
Kurdish total movement through the project of Türkiyelileşme. Between 2013 and 2015, the 
Kurds advocated a common and “dignified”29 co-existence of both Kurds and Turks within a 
democratic, multi-ethnic but united Turkey. This could be seen as opting for a more 
integrated way of mobilising and leaving behind, to a very large extent, the armed struggle as 
well as revolutionary/separatist nationalist rhetoric.  
Constitutional recognition of Kurdish national identity emerged as the ultimate priority 
of the Kurdish struggle. It was also the key to the realisation of the demands of Kurdish 
activists such as achieving administrative local autonomy, mainly through democratic 
channels. Turkey‟s administrative system is highly centralised and dismissive of the 
country‟s regional diversity and provincial nuances. The Kurdish movement insisted on the 
possibility of developing a decentralised system representative of all regions of Turkey, 
where, for example, governors can be elected locally rather than centrally appointed from the 
capital Ankara. 
The right to education in their mother tongue and its official use in public remained 
another crucial topic among Turkey‟s Kurds. After long debates in the Parliament, a law 
regulating legal defence in one‟s mother tongue was approved in early 2013, permitting 
Kurdish-speaking prisoners to plead in Kurdish if they wished (Al Jazeera Turk, Hürriyet 
Daily News 2013). At the turn of 2015, a state television channel broadcasting since 2009 
entirely in Kurdish (and its various dialects) was renamed from TRT-6 to TRT-Kurdî [TRT-
Kurdish]. These regulations and many others, however, have fallen short of the demands of 
Kurdish activists. In 2012, the International Crisis Group reported that the majority of Kurds 
in Turkey refuse to compromise on the right to full education in their mother tongue. 
From the perspective of the project of Türkiyelileşme, it can be argued that during this 
time frame, Kurds have also experienced an identity shift from belonging to a separate 
Kurdish ethnicity that was forcefully integrated into Turkish citizenship to belonging to a 
distinct Kurdish ethnicity, which would willingly integrate into a Türkiyeli community 
(meaning to originate from Turkey). The Turkish grammatical rule applied to specific regions 
(for example, Konyalı for someone from the city of Konya) was applied to the country as a 
whole: calling people from Turkey as Türkiyeli and not necessarily as Turks. Passing from 
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“Turk” to “Türkiyeli” facilitated debates on the resolution of the Kurdish issue as Kurds 
would belong to a (shared) territory and not to a (dominant) ethnie. 
Interestingly, it can be argued that this has tentatively led to Ernest Renan‟s concept of 
nation defined as „a soul [and] a spiritual principle‟ (Renan 1887). According to Renan‟s 
spiritual theory of nation, what makes a nation is a common or shared history in conjunction 
with the current consent of the people to live together as a whole: the presence of a historical 
collective memory is as important as „the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the 
value of heritage‟ (Renan 1887). This desire to live together and the will to perpetuate the 
value of heritage can be perceived to transcend real differences in language, religion, race, 
interests and geography. Renan‟s conceptualisation of what makes a Türkiyeli community 
would diverge significantly from the more traditional conceptualisation of ethnic 
nationalisms as a political doctrine based on racial, linguistic, religious or geographical 
specificities. Renan‟s insistence on nations as a spiritual force, a foundation or cornerstone of 
national unity, goes to exemplify the desire of the Kurds for unification as members of a 
Türkiyeli community, perhaps leaving behind past traumas. 
 
Türkiyelileşme Found Support among the Turks  
 
A feeling of mistrust has always existed towards the Kurds or the Kurdish movement among 
diverse segments of Turkish society. The opposite is also true. Many Kurds assert that they 
do not trust Turkish society and the Turkish state. Additionally, despite its democratisation 
discourse, the Kurdish movement has not completely dismissed violence at different stages of 
its existence. The latter phenomenon has been particularly striking to observe when legal 
Kurdish representatives in Turkey failed to coordinate between different moves coming out 
of İmral  Island where Öcalan is kept, and Qandil Mountains in Northern Iraq – which is the 
primary base of the executive committee of the PKK. 
Turkish public opinion on these matters has been varied. Whereas some perceived the 
Kurdish movement as a real or potential threat to the territorial integrity of the Turkish state, 
and therefore rejected any formulation with an ethnic dimension – with the fear of it being 
“uncontrollable” in the future – others proved to be more receptive to the plight of the Kurds, 
and sometimes even defended Kurdish rights on different platforms. This spectrum of views 
in public opinion ranged from considering the Kurds as the weakest link in Turkey‟s progress 
to the belief that the Kurds are the utmost guarantor of possibly attaining a fully functioning 
democracy in Turkey despite their potential shortcomings. 
From the peace process through to 2015, there had been a significant change in 
perception within Turkish society vis à vis the Kurds or the Kurdish movement – resulting in 
more resonance and support for Kurdish rights (Akyel Collinsworth 2013; Uras 2015; Jégo 
2015). The democratisation discourse adopted by Kurdish activists and political 
representatives (within the context of a total social movement) found an echo within the 
wider Turkish public and civil society. This has led to what one might call a change in mind-
set toward the Kurdish people and their struggle, laying the ground for many Turkish 
democrats, leftists, labour activists and intellectuals alike to better question the paradigm of a 
homogeneous and nationalist Turkey and how this has never quite embraced the Kurds as a 
people. Indeed, it would have been more difficult to imagine (ethnic) Turks supporting the 
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Kurdish movement had they continued to perceive of the Kurds as a violent entity, seeking 
Turkey‟s territorial disintegration. 
Another perfect example for perception changes followed prior to the presidential 
elections in August 2014. Both the 2013 Gezi Park protests
30
 and the 17-25 December 2013 
corruption scandal
31
 had diminished the people‟s faith in their government, increasing distrust 
against “moderate Islamists” (i.e. the AKP). This political polarisation, coupled with the 
general uncertainty about the Kurdish peace process as well as the perceived incapacity of 
mainstream Turkish opposition parties in terms of dealing with the country‟s political affairs, 
sparked off other dynamics in Turkey's political arena. Selahattin Demirta  – a Kurd and co-
president of the HDP (previously the Peace and Democracy Party, BDP) – presented himself 
as a presidential candidate with the promise of building an “alternative” Turkey. It turned out 
that nearly 10 per cent of Turkey‟s voters cast their ballots for the Kurdish candidate (Ete 
2014), making this presidential campaign one of the highest stages of a total social movement 
and its visionary project, Türkiyelileşme. For the first time in decades, the Kurds, via their 
representatives, were able to address wider Turkish audiences, conveying their demands for 
constitutional recognition, which they deemed was finally possible in a transformed Turkey. 
 
The Limits of the Kurdish Case as a Total Social Movement  
 
From 2013 onward until 2015, the Kurdish total social movement underwent several 
important and ostensibly paradoxical phases.
32
 At times it has been a movement with 
nationalist overtones, concentrating all its efforts on strict identity politics and the salvation 
of the historically oppressed Kurdish lands and identity. This became extremely visible every 
time national and legislative elections took place as well as in the aftermath of the detention 
or arrest of Kurdish political activists for their alleged support for or links with the PKK 
(Bianet 2010, 2014). The hardcore nationalist dimension of the movement could also be 
observed during guerrilla or civilian funerals, by the slogans protesters chanted, and the 
symbols, flags and pictures they displayed. These events seemed to impact the Kurds‟ 
“wounded” national sentiments deeply (Associated Press 2011).  
Nevertheless, the 2013 peace process was able to develop based on a fragile but mutual 
consensus, for a period of two years, giving the impression that military options could finally 
be gradually eliminated. While such discourses were being pronounced, other trends could 
also make their voice heard under the roof of the same movement when proponents of 
military solutions publicly praised the Kurdish armed campaign and the imperative for 
continuing to challenge the state mechanisms strictly with this mind-set. Whether it was the 
public praise for Kurdish armed insurgency or merely the continuing presence of armed 
groups that led to such contradictory discourses within the movement is debatable, but it is 
certain that this created great confusion within the Kurdish total social movement parameters, 
particularly at the grassroots level, but also from the perspective of observers. 
What distinguishes the Kurdish movement from classical cases of total social 
movements (e.g. the Polish Solidarity movement) is indeed its particular historical and 
current context, infused with unfulfilled nationalist aspirations as well as the element of 
militancy in terms of the armed struggle component of the movement. The impact of the 
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Kurdish armed struggle, which cannot be overlooked, on the mobilisation of “above-ground” 
activities
33
 of the Kurdish movement is a particularity which might not be found in other total 
social movement contexts, and therefore an amendment to the general literature on total 
social movements can be suggested. 
The impact of Kurdish military activities has proved to be vital in the Kurdish 
movement, and has often constituted the driving force of grassroots social movement 
participation. To cite one example, and as mentioned earlier, the most important mobilisation 
of the Kurds in the region can be seen to take place in the aftermath of a clash between the 
Turkish army and Kurdish guerrillas on the occasion of guerrilla funerals. Thousands of 
people gather in what is but a single, disorganised, random meeting. People in large numbers 
including men, women, elderly and youth, seemingly highly organised, with colours, flags, 
and slogans, demonstrate that they are a committed side in this conflict. 
In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to think of the aforementioned social movement 
performances as being fundamentally animated with the same political spirit as that of the 
PKK, its affiliated organisations, supporters and sympathiser communities. This can be 
explained by two interrelated reasons. The first stems from the PKK‟s perceived credibility as 
a resistance movement in Turkish jails in the 1980s as well as its armed insurgency in the 
Kurdish mountains, villages and towns since then. The second is that other Kurdish groups in 
the region seem to have failed to address the Kurdish grassroots as effectively as the PKK. 
Therefore, it would be wrong to look at the dynamics of the Kurdish movement irrespective 
of this context, in which the PKK is the main actor.
34
 Yet, this is the very point where a 
generic total social movement theory can be put to the test: the total social movement in the 
Kurdish case seems to grow in the shadow of the PKK. 
Considering these aspects, this article challenges the total social movement theory. On 
the one hand it is possible to argue that the Kurdish movement between 2013 and 2015 can 
be characterised by its non-violent, civil practices as a total social movement, yet on the other 
hand, its performances have seemed to be motivated, and often times determined, by the 
PKK‟s political agenda and the cycle in which they all operate. For instance, although 
unemployment, poverty, lack of infrastructure and services has remained exceptionally high 
in the region, Kurdish activists did not seem to mobilise specifically on these issues. This 
phenomenon can be called “the failure of the social” in the Kurdish total social movement. 
However, a way to overcome this challenge would be to examine the hidden factors driving 
Kurdish activists and ordinary citizens to mobilise with the idea that social actors do not 
solely act on behalf of a political agenda. They take to the streets in the pursuit of change. 
Kurdish activists definitely add new dimensions to the movement in which they participate, 
with their own personal stories of poverty, unemployment or discrimination. 
The three major events studied in this article have drawn attention to tell an important 
story: the Kurdish movement in Turkey remains extremely mobilised and organised. While 
parts of the Kurdish movement continue to keep their faith with the mountains and the 
necessity to have armed power, others are completely immersed in civil society and Turkey‟s 
legal politics. The latter allows us to conclude that Kurds are a stakeholder in Turkish society 
and state mechanisms. Evidence of this includes the otherwise very rare occurrence of 
Turkish flags during public gatherings and rallies organised by Kurdish activists in their 
regions and across Turkey, both prior to and in the aftermath of elections (Milliyet 2015). For 
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long years, advocating for the Kurdish cause meant rejection of all forms of belonging to 
Turkish identity. The appearance of Turkish flags in various Kurdish demonstrations 
epitomise the path taken by the Kurdish movement in its quest for Türkiyelileşme. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has focused on the Kurdish movement from a total social movement perspective 
between 2013 and 2015 when the Kurdish decision to operate within and in opposition to the 
Turkish state reached a peak with three major events: the declaration of the 2013 peace 
process between the Turkish state, the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan; the candidacy of a Kurdish 
activist to run for Presidency; and the breakthrough by Kurdish candidates from the HDP in 
crossing the world‟s highest and most undemocratic electoral threshold in the June 2015 
Turkish general elections. 
Central to Touraine‟s approach, as it has been to mine, is the process in which social 
actors identify themselves with their claims and demands in opposition to an adversary as 
part of a historical project. When this project contains three interrelated dimensions – social, 
political and national – Touraine posits the emergence of a total social movement. He draws 
his theory from the case of the Solidarity movement that emerged in Poland in early 1980s. 
Solidarity presented itself as a total social movement by being: (a) simultaneously trade-
unionist with the strikes of workers whose numbers had reached 10 million; (b) nationally-
driven as Solidarity‟s goal was to cast aside the party regime at the national level against the 
Soviet Union; and (c) democracy-advocating as it insisted on the creation of independent 
unions, freedom of speech and freedom of association. According to Touraine‟s logic, this 
movement was able to survive between 1980 and 1981 as it also stayed loyal to its original 
dynamics, and resisted committing to an overarching strict ideology whilst also opting for 
non-violent resistance. 
Based on Touraine‟s theoretical framework, this article has argued that, particularly 
from 2013 through to 2015, the Kurdish movement in Turkey functioned as a total social 
movement by virtue of its capacity to combine civil society activism and the promotion of 
democracy with the articulations of a national identity, the nucleus of which had never 
disappeared. During this time frame, the Kurdish movement engaged in a peace process, 
channelled its energy into civil society activism and broader electoral campaigns, promoted 
the idea of a fully functioning democracy, and ultimately an inclusive understanding of 
national identity for all the components of Turkish society, and not just the Kurds, via a 
project of Türkiyelileşme. After the snap elections of November 2015, this context has 
shifted. There was a resumption of violence between the Turkish forces and the PKK, which 
spilled into urban areas, undermining the Kurdish movement‟s overall position as a total 
social movement. Touraine stresses that violence is a red line in the criteria to qualify as a 
total social movement. In the 1980s, the Solidarity movement had succeeded in its objectives 
against the authoritarian communist government in Poland. By way of contrast, the Kurdish 
total social movement in Turkey was crushed following the resumption of violence in 2015 
and the ensuing growth of Turkish state authoritarianism.   
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Notes 
 
1. The concept of a total social movement is inspired by the vast social movement literature 
which exceeds the scope of this paper. However, in order to get a glimpse of traditional 
social movements, we can, once again, refer to Touraine for whom the three principles of 
identity, opposition and totality should be present. In its broadest sense, identity in a 
social movement can be defined as the act of participants identifying themselves through 
the movement. Touraine qualifies identity through a Marxist prism, positing that this 
sense of identity is determined by the social conflict i.e., not in positive terms but rather 
in opposition to something else. This process further involves a certain degree of 
rationality as social actors are believed to define and assume their role against an 
oppositional adversary. Thus, the first principle, identity, is intrinsically linked to the 
second, opposition. In order to effectively organise itself, a social movement must define 
its opponent. As for the third defining aspect of social movements, Touraine theorises that 
social activists are capable of renegotiating any aspect of society or social organisation 
through their struggle. In order to achieve this renegotiation, however, social movement 
participants embrace the principle of totality, which is the will for radical social 
transformation and self-production of society. For more details, see Touraine (1977). 
2. This manuscript has been largely inspired and informed by the author‟s own doctoral 
research conducted between 2012 and 2015.  
3. For a secondary source, see Martell and Stammers (1996). 
4. In December 1981, in a primary attempt to destroy the union, the government in Poland 
declared martial law. Then, an economic crisis was declared to be under way. In response, 
Solidarity did not compromise on its non-violent, national and democracy-advocating 
nature. The militants of Solidarity reached a common ground, in a relative way, between 
trade-union activity and political action. 
5. By way of example, we may note the increase of votes for the (pro-Kurdish) HDP in the 
2015 Turkish elections. 
6. The PKK is included in this definition for the times during which it has renounced the 
armed campaign in order for the Kurdish movement to be able qualify as a total social 
movement à la Touraine. 
7. This observation is mainly based on the author‟s doctoral fieldwork in the province of 
Diyarbak r, Turkey in 2013. 
8. Here I refer to Civil Fridays, a civil disobedience campaign launched by the Peace and 
Democracy Party (BDP) in 2011. For more details, see Ba er (2011). 
9. In the words of a Turkey analyst, “[o]ne of the darkest legacies of the Turkish state‟s fight 
against the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in the 1990s is the large number of 
enforced disappearances that took place in the predominantly-Kurdish southeast region. 
Human rights workers in the region believe some 1,000 people to have disappeared by 
suspected state actors during that time” (Schleifer 2012).  
10. I borrow the term “social space” from Alain Touraine. 
11. It is important to note that a team of Turkish intelligence and several PKK representatives 
sat at a preliminary negotiation table in the Norwegian capital, Oslo before the 
announcement of the peace process in 2012. The recordings of the Oslo talks were 
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revealed to the media in September 2011 by unspecified sources. These recordings 
remain available on YouTube to this day: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4hpuUakmcKM.  
12. For a literary account of conflict perceptions in Turkey‟s Kurdish regions, see Kinzer 
(2006).  
13. Author‟s translation from Turkish. 
14. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is the founder of the Republic of Turkey. 
15. At its most basic form, radical democracy advocates the inclusion and acceptance of 
differences that are absent in a universalist system to the detriment of particularities; in 
socialism at the detriment of political freedoms; in capitalism with its strict applications 
creating inequalities; and in liberalism with its inability to correct the aforementioned. For 
a further reference on radical democracy as applied to the Kurdish case, see Tekdemir 
(2018).  
16. Öğünç conducted interviews with the co-chairs and a sociologist member of the Şehitlik 
Council, as well as a delegate from the Kurdish Democratic People's Congress (DTK). 
17. The holy birth week refers to the birth week of the Prophet Muhammad, celebrated 
between 14-20 April.  
18. This information is gathered by the author during a focus-group activity on 5 December 
2013 in the premises of DİAY-DER in Diyarbak r, Turkey. 
19. For a quick summary on the mobilisations of the Polish Solidarity movement, see 
Bartkowski (2009). 
20. For more details, see Nûbihar Komele (2012). 
21. A “Women Unit of Diyarbak r Metropolitan Municipality” was established on 8 March 
2012 with the objective to fight patriarchal mentality at institutional levels.  
22. For a thorough study on the effects of conflict on women and their increasing 
predominance in Turkey‟s political life, see Demokratik Geli im Enstitüsü [Democratic 
Progress Institute] (2011).  
23. For more details, see İzci (2013); Lowen (2015). 
24. For more details, see Burç (2018). 
25. The HDP was initially founded in 2012 after a merger with the Peace and Democracy 
Party (BDP) in the aftermath of the municipal elections of March 2014. It should also be 
noted that the idea of establishing a Kurdish political party for all peoples of Turkey came 
initially from Öcalan. The BDP‟s campaign during the 2014 elections had primarily 
focused on Kurdish rights within a constitutional framework. This strategy might have 
secured the Kurdish nationalist vote but perhaps represented a risk for the Kurdish 
movement to marginalise itself in the long term. Following the 2014 elections, Öcalan 
called upon the BDP to organise under a new party that would not refer to a specific 
ethnic identity but address all of Turkey‟s concerns. The HDP has thus come into 
existence with an aim to establish a platform encompassing all the opposition forces and 
individuals or groups who had previously been disadvantaged vis à vis the dominant 
majority (politically the AKP or ethnically the Turks). The HDP consisted of Kurdish 
activists of all stripes but also appealed to a wider civil society, including segments of the 
non-Kemalist Turkish left. For more details on the HDP as an indispensable actor in 
Turkish politics, see Göksel and Tekdemir (2018); Tekdemir (2016).    
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26. For the information of the reader, Faz l Say, a distinguished Turkish pianist and 
composer, and, Adalet Agaoğlu, a renowned Turkish author and playwright were among 
those who publicly declared support for the HDP. 
27. Turkish election results are available at http://secim.haberler.com/2015/.    
28. Turkey's election performance index is available at http://secim.aa.com.tr/index.html.  
29. The emphasis on the term “restoring dignity” was made by the author‟s interviewees 
during doctoral fieldwork in 2013 in Turkey. For a further reference, see Okçuoğlu 
(2015).  
30. Initially caused by the government‟s urban development plan that would demolish 
Istanbul‟s Gezi Park in May 2013, the Gezi protests turned out to be a large wave of 
demonstrations asking for more civil liberties. For more details, see Göksel and Tekdemir 
(2018).  
31. The 2013 Turkish corruption scandal refers to a criminal and bribery investigation 
involving key people in the government and their relatives.  
32. For more details in the literature of instrumentalism for understanding paradoxes in a 
movement‟s discourse and practices, see Zuckerman (2009). 
33. I borrow this term from Gay Seidman.  
34. For more details, see Yegen (2017). 
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